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Labour as an Agent of Change: 
The Case of China
Tim Pringle
Does China’s development pathway represent a ‘new developmentalist’ alterna-
tive to neoliberal policies? Or does the fact that over 250 million Chinese people 
have been lifted out of poverty at the same time as the country has integrated into 
the global capitalist system render the country a poster child for neoliberalism 
itself? By focusing on the central question of labour relations, this chapter argues 
that in fact neither interpretation can help us understand China’s transition 
from a centrally planned command economy to a decentralised market economy. 
Instead, the emerging new labour movement opens up the space to think about 
alternatives beyond the inequalities of neoliberalism and the top-down structural 
impositions and constraints on labour generally associated with new develop-
mentalism. Furthermore, thinking about Chinese development from a labour 
movement perspective reminds us of a core aspect of Marx’s thinking – the 
relationship between class struggle and change.
 The structure of the chapter is straightforward. First, I take an historical 
approach to examining the principal features of China’s transition from a labour 
perspective. Then I look at the response of workers. Finally, I take up the question 
of the alternatives that are emerging in the demands of a working class that, 
as we shall see, has undergone both an unmaking and a remaking. The chapter 
broadly addresses the question of building a labour movement which, by virtue 
of the sheer size of the working class in China, has the potential to generate 
alternatives to global capitalism.
China in Transition
Although there was significant continuity between pre and post liberation 
China, most of the literature dates the birth of ‘new’ China to the Communist 
Party of China’s (CPC) victory over the Guomindang. The Guomindang was 
initially founded by the anti-imperialist nationalist Sun Yat-sen and later led 
by the fanatical anti-communist Chiang Kai-shek; the CPC’s victory over his 
party concluded more than two decades of intermittent civil war. The People’s 
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Republic of China was formally established in October 1949 when Mao Zedong 
famously announced that the ‘people of China have stood up’, ending centuries 
of imperialist incursions by the West and Japan and dispatching the Guomindang 
to Taiwan. 
 For most of the decade that followed, China emulated the Soviet model, as 
thousands of technicians and millions of roubles arrived from the USSR as part of 
an aid programme designed in part to offset the US policy of containment of the 
new republic. However, tensions between Mao and Stalin developed throughout 
the 1950s, culminating in the withdrawal of Soviet technicians – with the blue-
prints of various large-scale development projects – as the two ‘socialist’ states 
teetered on the brink of war. China was left in a state of semi-isolation which 
continued right up to the eve of the reform era in 1978. From an international 
perspective, China was contained by the post-war policies of the United States 
and its concomitant determination to control, or least influence, the outcome 
of decolonisation around the world. China nonetheless contributed towards 
processes of post-colonial state building with aid and support for infrastructure 
projects, notably in Africa.
 Prior to 1978, Chinese labour relations centred on the construction of the 
urban danwei (or work unit) into which state-owned and collectively owned 
enterprises were organised. The danwei was understood not as a set of means 
of production but as a unit of labour, comprising all employees from the general 
director down to the cleaner, who were all equally employees of the state and 
organised into the same trade union (Pringle and Clarke, 2011: 6). Industrial 
workers enjoyed higher standards of living than peasants in China, who were 
mostly excluded from the danwei by a system of household registration (hukou 
zhidu) which divided the population into urban and rural categories. The 
household registration system formed part of an overall development strategy 
that prioritised heavy industry over rural development, and required a degree of 
administrative state coercion to prevent migration to the towns.
 Any inherent stability that this state-led, redistributive and repressive model 
of development might contain was continually rocked by political campaigns, as 
politics polarised during the late 1950s. Following the successful implementation 
of China’s First Five-Year Plan (1953–57), which nationalised the entire economy, 
Mao and his supporters in the CPC embarked on a series of campaigns which 
included wildly ambitious production targets (the Great Leap Forward, 1958–59) 
and an all-out attack on the party-state bureaucracy – the Cultural Revolution 
(1966–69), which only just stopped short of civil war. Indeed, the consequent 
fear of a return to the chaos and economic stagnation of the Cultural Revolution 
years at least partly informed the CPC’s decision to introduce a major agricul-
tural reform known as the Household Responsibility System (HRS) in 1978 
(Pringle, 2013). The HRS heralded the return to household-based farming and 
the dismantling of collective people’s communes that had been set up during the 
collectivisation of agriculture in the late 1950s. Even more dramatically, it paved 
the way for a new industrial strategy that was to break, via privatisation, the 
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‘iron rice bowl’ of permanent employment and relative welfare security that the 
urban working class had secured under the danwei system. The journey back to 
capitalist labour relations, which pitched the interests of labour against those of 
private capital while the state withdrew from the micromanagement of industry, 
had begun. What did this mean for labour? More importantly, what were the 
demands raised by labour?
‘Crossing the River by Feeling for the Stones’: The Triumph of Gradualism
Profoundly conscious of the potential power of China’s now much larger working 
class, the CPC approached industrial reform with caution, as epitomised by Deng 
Xiaoping’s phrase cited above. Fixed-time contracts gradually replaced permanent 
employment for new hires after 1986, and state-owned enterprise (SOE) managers 
were given powers over hiring, firing and profit retention. The 1989 Democracy 
Movement, which culminated in a bloody crackdown on students and workers 
who had formed autonomous organisations, slowed the pace of SOE reform as 
the state, fearful of reigniting further national-scale protests, pulled back from 
implementing widespread redundancies. However, increasing competition from 
township and village enterprises that had emerged out of the disbanded rural 
communes and an expanding private sector fuelled by foreign direct investment 
(FDI) increased the economic pressure on the large loss-making state sector. As 
China moved to the centre of the global capitalist economy during the 1990s, the 
case for restructuring gradually took on the mantle of political timing rather than 
political choice, as the influence of competitive capitalist accumulation came to 
dominate the CPC’s economic policy.
 The Fifteenth Party Congress in 1997 was a key event in the transition to an 
economy dominated by capitalist labour relations integrated into global produc-
tion networks via China’s engagement with globalisation. Having recovered from 
the trauma of the massacre in Tiananmen Square, the CPC formally announced 
the policy of ‘holding on to the large and letting go of the small and medium-sized 
enterprises’. Despite the continuing emphasis on caution, this announcement was 
interpreted as a green light for the privatisation of many SOEs and consequent 
laying-off of up to 50 million urban workers (though the numbers vary). Laid-off 
SOE workers were exhorted to ‘liberate thinking’ (jiefang sixiang) and ‘jump into 
the sea’(xia hai) of self-employment – effectively the informal economy. The state 
attempted to cushion the impact of mass lay-offs via a policy of phased redundancy 
(xiagang), stipulating that SOEs should provide retraining to laid-off workers 
and keep them on the books for three years with a monthly livelihood stipend. 
Phasing redundancy in this way did not head off resistance, but the sequencing, 
‘spin’ – the ‘p’ of privatisation was carefully avoided in official discourse – and the 
multiple categories of redundancy all helped to divide workers and moderate the 
resistance discussed in the next section.
 As employment in the state sector shrank, the private sector grew, with 
increased diversity of ownership and the expansion of special economic zones. 
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Export-oriented private companies did not carry the welfare responsibilities 
and employment guarantees associated with SOE employment. Moreover, their 
adoption of flexible employment practices which frequently violated legally 
backed labour standards on wages, working hours, health and safety and repro-
ductive rights, facilitated integration into global markets via ever-decreasing lead 
times for orders from international brands outsourcing production to China. 
Suppliers became one node in global production chains which transferred 
risk down the chain and eventually on to the young shoulders of the millions 
of people moving into off-farm employment for the first time. Restrictions on 
residence remain in place as a form of social control rather than a demographic 
policy instrument, but they have been considerably relaxed to ensure the release 
of what Marx called a reserve army of labour (that is, new swathes of unemployed 
workers) from the countryside who serve to discipline the ‘new’ workforce and 
keep wages down.
  The consequence was that Chinese workers employed in these new spaces 
of accumulation were subject to harsh and sometimes violent labour regimes 
(Chan, 2001) dictated by the forces of neoliberal globalisation. Suppliers to 
global brands indulged in hyper-exploitation to meet lead times, and local 
governments frequently ignored China’s first national Labour Law (1995) in an 
effort to maintain investor-friendly environments. However, the state did not 
leave the ensuing class conflict to the mercies of unregulated market forces, as 
many neoliberals might have wished. The Party has certainly withdrawn from the 
day-to-day management of industrial relations via the dismantling of the danwei 
in what could be construed as a neoliberal rolling-back of the state. However it 
has deployed administrative (hukou) and legal institutions (the construction of a 
regulatory labour relations framework) as conduits for direct state intervention 
in labour relations and evolving labour markets. Above all, the state has limited 
legal labour organisation to the CPC-led All China Federation of Trade Unions 
(ACFTU).
  Underlying these interventions has been a determination to uphold social 
stability and maintain CPC rule, as the Party has adopted aspects of both neolib-
eral and state-led prescriptions in pursuit of economic growth. For example, 
while the deregulation of labour markets has been a key aspect of neoliberal 
policies globally, China’s labour markets have remained subject to sometimes 
contradictory regulatory and institutional influence. The fragmentary impact 
of hukou restrictions continues to hinder the integration of urban and rural 
labour markets as well as weaken workers’ ability to defend collective rights 
and interests. Labour markets are further segmented by spatially influenced 
variations, as different types of enterprise ownership collide with different local 
political economies at different stages of transition.
 In 2008 the state appeared to move against the global tide of employment 
informalisation which has been such a distinguishing feature of neoliberal 
globalisation. The introduction of the Labour Contract Law (LCL) in the face 
of organised opposition from the forces of domestic and international capital 
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appeared to be an attempt to slow the rate of informalisation by providing 
workers with stronger and standardised contractual rights. The LCL carries 
an entire chapter on collective contracts, suggesting a move to encourage the 
collectivisation of labour relations and even promote – albeit very cautiously – 
collective bargaining as an instrument of class compromise. Also in 2008 the 
Labour Mediation and Arbitration Law attempted to render juridical channels of 
dispute resolution more user-friendly to workers. While these laws and policies 
do little to change the fact that labour power has become a commodity in China, 
they nevertheless do not entirely conform to the global trend of informalisation 
and the removal of constraints on the commodification of labour.
 Despite the weak position of labour in the transition period, the CPC has not 
relaxed the ban on independent working-class organisation. The Trade Union 
Law grants an organisational monopoly to the ACFTU, which remains obliged by 
its own constitution to accept the leadership of the CPC. Attempts by workers 
to organise outside these restrictions are severely punished with prison terms. At 
the same time, the ACFTU has come under considerable pressure from the CPC 
itself to improve its credibility among workers, especially migrant workers in the 
private sector, where the institution remains weak and largely ineffective, and at 
the enterprise level. The source of this pressure has been China’s nascent labour 
movement, to which we now turn our attention.
The Forces of Labour in China
As a central plank of CPC policy following the Fifteenth Party Congress, the 
restructuring of SOEs left the traditional urban working class with very little 
room to manoeuvre. Although the ACFTU stood to lose from the demise of its 
power base in the state sector – principally as a labour welfare bureaucracy, 
rather than a representative organisation of workers – it was never likely to put 
the interests of workers before party policy. Nevertheless workers themselves did 
not simply roll over, and there was widespread but geographically scattered resis-
tance to redundancies (Cai, 2002). The resistance climaxed in a six-week protest 
by as many as 80,000 laid-off oil workers in the city of Daqing in 2002, during 
which the state deployed army units on the outskirts of town and riot police in 
the squares occupied by the workers.
 Yet from a strategic perspective, the fact that most protests against restruc-
turing were organised after workers had been laid off – including in Daqing 
– meant that local authorities were faced with issues of crowd control rather 
than having to break strikes and restart production. To this end, the Ministry 
of Public Security issued guidelines to local police forces not to exacerbate the 
tension by resorting to blanket repression as protests by laid-off workers were 
coming to a head. The most effective repression involved the arrest of workers’ 
leaders combined with an immediate ‘goodwill’ subsidy to workers to meet 
their most urgent financial needs, such as food bills, a child’s school textbook 
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or medical expenses. In general the process of breaking the ‘iron rice bowl’ was 
skilfully managed by the Party, preventing laid-off workers from making common 
cause with those still in employment – and thereby transforming protests into 
strikes. This is significant because strikes have the inherent capacity to disrupt or 
even stop production. If the protests by laid-off oil workers had spread to those 
still in work, the immense power of energy sector workers in particular would 
have been felt at different nodes of the global production chains that FDI and the 
Chinese state had carefully constructed.
 The situation in the private sector presents a different set of conditions. The 
‘unmaking’ of China’s traditional urban working class has been accompanied by 
the ‘making’ of a new proletariat, as millions of people moved into non-agricul-
tural employment. Current official figures put the number of migrant workers at 
approximately 250 million, in effect the largest rural–urban migration in human 
history. As xiagang proved an effective policy instrument to administer restruc-
turing, so hukou has demonstrated its capacity to supply and discipline a young 
workforce employed in the manufacturing, construction and service sectors.
 In the early to mid-1980s, the first generation of migrants found themselves 
in a straitjacket of exploitation as they left the land in search of a way out of 
poverty. Capital provided the main body of the garment (employment) while the 
state fastened the straps with various legal and political constraints on resistance 
(hukou) and organisation (denial of the right to organise). Most acts of resistance 
were short-lived and fragmented by place-of-origin loyalties, as class conscious-
ness remained undeveloped among young people encountering the factory 
system for the first time. These protests were often met with local state-spon-
sored or employer-organised violence. Demands were generally directed at local 
government officials via demonstrations outside local labour bureaux, as migrant 
workers attempted to induce the local state to enforce the minimum labour 
standards stipulated in China’s first national Labour Law (1995).
Class Consciousness
Scholars have contrasted the scattered, street-based ‘protests of desperation’ of 
SOE workers in ‘rustbelt’ industries with the ‘protests against discrimination’ of 
migrant workers denied the same rights as urban workers. Lee (2007) argues 
that migrant workers are more likely to use the law in their attempts to uphold 
employment rights, a process that forms part of a wider struggle for full citizen-
ship denied by hukou. This approach is critiqued by Anita Chan (2008) on the 
grounds that the situation of migrant workers is often just as desperate as that 
of laid-off state workers and that the former also resort to extralegal ‘militant’ 
forms of protests on the streets. Chan seems to suggest the difference is one 
of ‘consciousness’ but does not clarify whether this is a class consciousness or 
some form of ‘citizen’ consciousness: ‘[T]he day when migrant workers demand 
abolition of the hukou system will mark the maturation of their consciousness’.
 Recent empirical reality allows us to cut through this debate. Since the turn of 
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the century, a number of factors have combined to produce conditions in which 
migrant workers have been able to move from defensive protests targeting govern-
ment officials to strikes aimed directly at employers, reflecting the emergence of 
class consciousness as expressed through collective strike action (compare Basso, 
Chapter 8). These include the onset of structural labour shortages beginning in 
2003; the arrival of second and third generations of migrants whose connection 
to the land is much weaker than that of their parents; and an accumulation of 
knowledge of both the factory system and the law. Widespread access to infor-
mation and communications technology has helped the current generation of 
migrant workers to understand their strong bargaining position in global produc-
tion chains and also to organise labour actions more effectively. At the same time, 
the generalised alarm in government regarding the political risks of maintaining 
high levels of inequality that have emerged as a result of the reforms has also 
encouraged local officials to implement labour laws that at least restrain the 
worst excesses of employers.
 Lee is certainly correct to argue that migrant workers have made use of the 
juridical channels of dispute resolution through which the state has tried – and 
failed – to individualise and fragment labour struggles. But these tactics have 
not ruled out street protests, short work stoppages and even the occasional 
battle with the police. In Guangdong province, the growth in legal activism 
has not prevented other forms of resistance. For example, long struggles for 
diagnosis, medical care and financial compensation from employers for occupa-
tional disease, such as the campaigns by Gold Peak battery workers and Lucky 
Gem jewellery workers, demonstrate a nonlinear mix of tactics. These include 
pursuing suppliers through legal channels, shaming multinational companies in 
the media, disrupting shareholder meetings outside China, strikes, protests and 
even occupations of government offices.1 Indeed it is rare for disputes to follow 
a ‘common sense’ linear progression from juridical channels to some form of 
collective disruption of capital accumulation, as ‘militancy’ increases in inverse 
proportion to desperation.
 A more reliable framework for interpreting the growth of migrant worker 
labour disputes distinguishes between individual labour rights and collective 
class interests. This approach is used by Chan and Pun, who suggest that ‘the 
making of a new working class is increasingly conscious of and participating 
in interest-based or class-orientated labour protests’ (2009: 287). I would add 
that this approach to understanding growing labour militancy in China should 
not be based on an assumption that there is a clear line dividing struggles over 
individually defined labour rights and labour interests collectivised by workers’ 
autonomous agency.
 One indication of the transition from rights to interests in authoritarian 
post-state-socialist countries such as China is the emergence of demands that 
go beyond the minimum standards stipulated by the law. These can be both 
1 See Globalization Monitor: www.globalmon.org.hk/tags/cadmium-poisoning
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economic and political, and can elicit state intervention and compromises 
from capital – or not. For example, a wave of strikes across six southern ports 
in Guangdong between March and May 2007 climaxed in a 33-hour stoppage 
at the Yantian International Container Terminals (YICT), which is part of the 
Singapore-listed Hutchinson Port Holdings Trust and the fourth largest port 
in the world. The strike by well-paid gantry and tower crane operators had an 
immediate and potentially disastrous impact on exports to Western markets, and 
was launched in pursuit of three basic demands: lowering of pay differentials 
with white collar workers; an increase in basic pay including a paid lunch break; 
the replacement of the management-sponsored staff association with an effective 
trade union funded by the workers themselves.
 In 2010 in another example, the demand for an effective plant-level trade 
union was echoed in a watershed 19-day strike by workers at Honda’s Ben Tian 
car-parts plant in Foshan, Guangdong province. As at the port, the demands were 
political and economic: a pay rise and the ‘reorganisation’ of the trade union 
at the plant via the recall of the existing trade union representatives and the 
election of a new committee. With their operations in China heading towards 
a complete halt, Honda’s management had little choice but to participate in 
collective bargaining with 30 elected worker representatives who had obtained 
advice from China’s best-known labour scholar, Professor Chang Kai. The dispute 
triggered a wave of strikes that spread beyond Guangdong and beyond the auto 
industry, again highlighting the strong bargaining position of workers in sectors 
that are thoroughly integrated into global markets. In my view, these events 
provide the key to consolidating and expanding the emerging labour movement 
as the strikes seek to constrain globalised capital.
  Both strikes ended with management making significant concessions to the 
economic demands of the workers. Equally important was the role of the ACFTU 
in these disputes. One result of the rise in workers’ confidence to pursue their 
grievances through strike action has been significant pressure on the state union 
to improve its capacity to represent workers. In part this is reflects the CPC’s 
determination to head off independent worker organisations that could threaten 
the regime itself – the example of the Solidarity trade union in Poland was not 
lost on the CPC leadership. Thus at Yantian, the deputy chair of the Shenzhen 
Federation of Trade Unions (SFTU) rushed to the scene of the strike at 2 a.m., 
arriving to find a rowdy and tense situation. The SFTU told workers it supported 
their pay demands but that the establishment of a union branch at the port must 
be in accordance with the Trade Union Law. The workers’ more radical demand 
for an organisation of representatives directly funded by the workers themselves 
would constitute an illegal organisation. In the negotiations, the SFTU played a 
mediating role using its political connections with the CPC to extract guarantees 
from management not to take revenge on strike leaders after the dispute was 
settled. 
 During the Honda strike, the official trade union at provincial level 
(Guangdong) and city level (Guangzhou) went beyond the level of mediation 
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and provided passive support to the workers’ demands for a substantial pay 
rise. In contrast, the local township trade union’s response was to organise a 
physical picket-line attack on militant workers, for which it was instructed to 
issue an unprecedented public apology after pictures of the incident were widely 
publicised. The attack reignited worker solidarity, and the apology served as an 
indication to the strikers that they had the support of the higher-level unions.
 Both strikes produced at least partly elected trade union committees mostly 
made up of frontline workers. The strikes also represent the impact of shop floor 
militancy on a Party-led institution that had traditionally relied on appointed 
officials usually selected from the ranks of management. It is here that a second 
key strategy for building the labour movement comes into the spotlight. The 
demand for direct trade union elections so that workers can choose their own 
representatives has become an increasingly common feature of strikes. This 
strategy reduces the impact of the absence of freedom of association and has the 
potential to build a layer of enterprise-level trade union representatives closely 
connected to the lives and demands of ordinary workers. Although the unions 
operate under the legal constraints of the Trade Union Law, there is the potential 
for sector-level networks to cohere over collective bargaining issues – as indeed 
has been the case in the auto industry and even in some Wal-Mart retail stores.
 Two key factors render the growing class consciousness of China’s expanding 
working class particularly important for forcing changes to production relations. 
First, the state’s policy of tying economic development to integration in global 
markets has provided workers with an important source of structural power: the 
capacity to disrupt global trade flows and production chains as demonstrated 
by the Yantian port workers and Honda auto workers respectively. Imagine the 
potential (class) power generated by workers in these two sectors coming together 
in joint action! Second, the sheer size of the Chinese working class renders it a 
central player in determining the future of global capitalism and potential alter-
natives. According to the National Bureau of Statistics, there were 770 million 
employed people in China at the end of 2013. While it is important to avoid 
indulging in any kind of deterministic optimism on the basis of these figures, it is 
nevertheless difficult to overestimate how central the Chinese working class has 
become to neoliberal globalisation – and its possible demise. 
Alternatives to Development: State-Led or Worker-Led?
The CPC has certainly implemented – some would argue pioneered – a number 
of policies associated with new developmentalism. A national minimum wage 
set by local city governments and based, according to the regulations, on ‘actual 
existing conditions’; cash transfers to the urban poor in the form of a means-
tested minimum income subsidy; and employment creation – but not full 
employment – have been at the heart of the CPC’s entire reform-era strategy. 
However Deng Xiaoping’s famous slogan for the reforms – ‘let some get rich 
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first, so that others can get rich later’ – appears to be an embodiment of the 
class-based neoliberal ‘trickle-down’ prescription for economic growth. And yet, 
as Harvey notes, the market can do ‘little to transform an economy without a 
parallel shift in class relations, private property and all the other institutional 
arrangements that typically ground a thriving capitalist economy’ (2005: 122).
 The transformation of China’s class relations has been guided by the CPC’s 
concerns to retain its status as the ruling party in a one-party state presiding 
over a system which was once described as a mixed economy structured around 
state-led initiatives by the former chief economist at the World Bank, Joseph 
Stiglitz.2 Property rights have been gradually broadened – though hardly clarified 
in the neoliberal sense – to allow a full range of enterprise ownership. This has 
in turn led to the rise of a capitalist class with close and often corrupt ties to 
the CPC.
 In 2002, the CPC announced that it would allow business owners to join the 
Party, in what the Economist (2007) termed ‘a massive networking opportunity 
for bosses’. In 2004, the Constitution was amended to recognise and protect a 
‘citizen’s lawful private property [as] inviolable’, and in 2007 the Private Property 
Law of China was passed despite considerable opposition from leftists within the 
Party. On the other hand, all land remains the property of the state. Agricultural 
land is allocated for up to 30 years via tradeable land use rights overseen 
by village committees on the basis of (in theory) family requirements – an 
institution broadly supported by a majority of farmers.
 The system has not excluded land grabs chiefly carried out by property devel-
opers working closely with party committees at the county level. Such activity 
has provoked widespread protests in the countryside, and left approximately 
60 million people affected with little option but to seek non-farm work even as 
their hukou status as farmers denied them access to permanent urban residence. 
We might be reminded of the period of primitive accumulation that cleared the 
commons and heralded the growth of capitalism in England.
 The central government has proved incapable of preventing such digressions 
and unwilling to curb the repression that accompanies them. The experience of 
China’s rapidly expanding working class in the reform era has demonstrated (yet 
again) that state-led development requires a heavily repressive hand over labour. 
Indeed, the Chinese state’s capacity to ‘pick winners’ and use the banking system 
to support selected SOEs at the same time as implementing widespread priva-
tisation in the state sector and developing investor-friendly special economic 
zones to attract FDI has rested on the institutionalised repression of the Chinese 
working class. 
 The reforms have not been some kind of grand neoliberal shock programme 
of full-blown privatisation inspired by the Chicago school, as in much of Latin 
America or following the collapse of the Soviet Union. However Chinese 
2 See http://mises.org/daily/2960.
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development hardly fits into a programme of ‘full employment as a primary goal’ 
as stated by the Sao Paolo structuralist school.3
 State and capital in China have demonstrated willingness to work together to 
ensure that emerging capitalist social relations are shored up by existing fragmen-
tations rooted in geographic, spatial, gendered and cultural-linguistic divisions. 
And they have not hesitated to conspire in the repression of militant workers and 
activists organising in the workplace in order to prevent China’s ‘class against 
capital’ from becoming a ‘class for itself’ – to use the language employed by Marx 
to explain how unified labour movements emerge. But in spite of the constraints, 
the process of conscious class cohesion that is unfolding in China carries the 
potential for autonomous working-class organisation(s) based in workplaces that 
can act as both an entry point for militants and an institutional class memory 
that draws on lessons from defeats and develops strategy and tactics for future 
struggles. If we accept – as contributors to this book do – that such capacities 
lie at the heart of a genuine break with neoliberalism, and potentially capitalism 
itself, then the unparalleled size and global reach of the Chinese working class 
renders its struggles of profound relevance to making another world possible.
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